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Counterterrorist and counter-radicalisation policies not only have the potential to undermine the
democratic principles, institutions, and processes they seek to preserve but also to produce unintended
consequences.
Free Syrian Army fighters carry their weapons to the frontline in Damascus. Demotix/Majid Almustafa.
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The deadly attacks in Madrid (2004), London (2005), Glasgow (2007) and Stockholm (2010), followed
by the foiled attempts and arrests in Copenhagen (2010) and Berlin (2011) have together moved the
issue of violent extremism and ‘radicalisation’ back onto political agendas at the European Union and
across its member states.
Fear of ‘radicalisation’ has taken a turn for the worse since 2011 with the publication of alarmist
intelligence reports and the multiplication of news reports about European citizens flocking to Syria to
fight, mostly alongside the Syrian opposition.
Almost unnoticeably, the representation of Syria has moved from chaotic images of civil war to a
monstrous cradle for a resurgent Al-Qaida, a powerful magnet for confirmed Jihadists and a key
location for nurturing new generations of violent individuals.
The fear that European citizens travelling to Syria to fight the Assad regime may be influenced by
groups linked to Al-Qaida and the spectre of dozens of battle-hardened, experienced extremists
returning to their European homes full of anger and resentment and prepared to stage deadly attacks is
an anxious thought stuck in our minds.
Even though it is difficult to ascertain the number of European citizens who have gone to or are still in
Syria since March 2011 – the figures fluctuate between 400 to 2000 - the need for an assessment of
the threat posed by these assumed radicalised European fighters heading back home is largely shared
across the European Union member states. The recent French anti-radicalisation strategy presented
by the French interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve, in April 2014 and inspired by the British strategy, is
a reaction against the growing ranks of French youth joining alleged jihadist groups in Syria. However,
what is the logical link - if any - between an engagement in Syria – whatever it might be – and the
likelihood of future attacks in Europe?
A pervasive narrative of imminent danger
Our report for the European Parliament, Preventing and
countering youth radicalisation in the European Union,
released in April 2014 offers a rather simple answer[1]. We
commonly gauge the dangerousness of these returnees on
biased assumptions: going to Syria is very often read only
within the framework of an intentional desire for Jihad, and
radicalisation is commonly understood as a linear,
mechanical and incremental process following the old and
not so wise adage, once a thief, always a thief.
Unfortunately, these assumptions have contributed to the
production of a pervasive narrative about the nature and the
level of danger posed by these returnees. As spelt out by the
authors of the report, “If a “Jihad Candidate” can be found in
the ranks of multiple katibas grouped under the banner of the
Free Syrian Army (FSA), integration into a component of Al-
Nosra Front does not automatically denote an ideological
adherence to their action: in fact, many units are actually
more independent and pragmatic than the statements of the
leaders of the Front suggest” (p.15).
Secondly, the alarmist view of the danger of European citizens coming back from Damascus is
aggregating disparate trajectories and activities in Syria (from humanitarian support to combat
experience) under the same rather suspicious and certainly nervous agenda.
Thirdly, and perhaps more importantly, such views about returnees pay insufficient heed to the fact
that, across contemporary time and space - from the Spanish civil war to Bosnia, Mali, and Chechnya
via Afghanistan - continuities in commitment after direct involvement in violent conflicts are the
exception rather than the norm, and there is no reliable evidence that veterans of conflict move in that
direction.
Of course, some individuals might continue the struggle they have started to engage with in Mali, Syria
or elsewhere, but not necessarily in a violent way. More probably, most of the ‘returnees’ will not
continue the struggle.
As the report highlights, the term ‘radicalisation’ is an unhelpful concept for understanding the context,
contents and mechanisms of recruitment, activism, violence and escalation. People who become
involved in violent activities are not suddenly converted to this path and then inherently stuck with a
single-minded line of action. This process is gradual and it is an incremental dynamic full of uncertainty
about what might be next.
The unfortunately commonly shared idea that extremism is nothing but the fatal conclusion of an
ineluctable linear process is a crucial misunderstanding of the realities of violence. Worse, these
biased and narrow-minded understandings of ‘radicalisation’ have led to poorly conceptualized and
somewhat dangerous counter-terrorist policies across the European Union member states.
The Syrian tree that hides the forest?
When reviewing the numerous counter-terrorist and preventive counter-radicalisation policies in
Europe, we cannot point conclusively and entirely to their effectiveness. On the contrary, these counter-
terrorist policies – which allow for an extension of judicial and executive powers – and their
accompanying policies of prevention show mixed results.
Certainly, they raise key issues in terms of fundamental rights, ethnic and racial discrimination and
social cohesion. Real and legitimate concerns include the extension of pre-emptive judicial powers
across European countries coupled with significant extensions of the pre-charge detention period (the
United Kingdom leads in this respect), a disturbing growth in the weighting of intelligence material over
evidence in courts, a nearly all-embracing definition of ‘terrorism’ as an offence, a maximisation of the
scope of terrorist investigations and of terrorist arrests and wider control of online materials.
In addition to prosecutions, most European countries have developed a broad range of administrative
measures which have a considerable impact on the lives of many citizens in Europe. Stop and search
powers have been regularly denounced. As noted in the report, “These police powers are among the
most resented form of police interventions and generate a high level of alienation and feeling of
discrimination among targeted communities, with very little policing value” (p.22).
If immigration policy has always been inextricably linked to the European security agenda, the current
situation in Syria and growing concerns over European citizens fighting alongside Islamist groups, as
well as the subsequent fear of seeing ‘radicalised returnees’, have re-focused counter-terrorism and
counter-radicalisation efforts on harsher and more discriminatory forms of border control.
In the UK, for example, the control of ports and borders is encoded in schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act
2000. This allows, in principle, any police officer, immigration officer or customs officer to stop, question
and detain any person, as well as search luggage and vehicles, in order to ascertain whether he or she
might be concerned with acts of terrorism, for up to 9 hours.
Within the scope of administrative measures used to combat radicalisation, the deportation of foreign
nationals in France carried out on the grounds of serious threats to the public order is a rather
interesting measure. The assessment of such threats is generally solely based on intelligence services’
memos, with no obligation for them to disclose their sources. As noted in our report, “these powers
have a considerable broader impact in terms of the expansion of executive power over judicial
procedures” (p.26). Without any doubt and across Europe, police and intelligence services have been
given greater power to investigate terrorism alongside an increased surveillance and information-
gathering logic.
While this particular offensive trend is well established, the 2005 London bombings have contributed to
the implementation of preventive or soft counter-terrorist measures – e.g. the PREVENT strand of the
counter-terrorist strategy CONTEST in the United Kingdom. These preventive policies include the
establishment of partnerships with community representatives, investment in social and neighbourhood
projects, as well as mentoring schemes dedicated to youths considered “at risk” of radicalisation.
The concern that these measures would only contribute to the stigmatisation of and suspicion against
the Muslim community as a community composed entirely of potential terrorists has been widely
debated. More recently, it is the partnerships established between community representatives and
local counterterrorist police that have generated questions.
To what extent are these partnerships being used as a covert means of gathering intelligence about the
structure and relations within the community? As the report notes, “The focus of the most recent
PREVENT strategy (2011), as well as the results of the Prime Minister’s Task Force on Tackling
Radicalisation and Extremism (2013) further reinforce the fear of “snooping”, with the focus on
institutions such as schools, universities or hospitals, where teachers, professors or doctors are
encouraged to report potential ‘radicals’” (p.29). Certainly, the question of the adequacy of these
programmes altogether and in particular the lack of distinction between social work and local policing is
very challenging.
While these different measures might not directly contribute to the escalation of violence per se, they
have in several instances been found to generate a feeling of suspicion that is unhelpful to the relations
between the state and Muslim communities across Europe. As we report, “radicalisation and counter-
radicalisation co-exist and shape one another. The EU agenda has been inspired by the context of the
war on terror and needs to be profoundly revised considering its perverse effects. […] widespread
counter-radicalisation measures across European Union Member States might become factors for
radicalisation, instead of preventing radicalisation” (p.31).
European countries have undertaken progressively more stringent counterterrorist measures in the
name of national security and the safety of citizens and have attempted to avert the growth of extremist
views by implementing preventive and counter-radicalisation policies.
As  Preventing and countering youth radicalisation in the EU makes clear, European counterterrorist
and counter-radicalisation policies not only have the potential to undermine the democratic principles,
institutions, and processes they seek to preserve but also to produce unintended consequences; rather
than discouraging violence, they may trigger and encourage it. Actually, we may need to be more
concerned by trends in European counter-radicalisation policies’, their social and political effects, and
their unintended consequences rather than by European citizens heading to Syria who, if they come
back, mostly come back disillusioned.
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